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I
f ever there were a crisis mo ment that crystallized the need for reforming the U.S. health care delivery system, this is it. The 2010 Affordable Care Act (ACA) promises to expand health insur ance coverage, a key first step toward improving health equity. But newly insured Americans will gain access to a strained, frag mented system that often fails to deliver effective, efficient care. Meanwhile, the burden of chronic disease, coupled with incentives that reward providers when pre ventable complications occur, con tinue to drive up health care spending.
To address these escalating problems of quality and afford ability, many analysts and policy makers support the development of accountable care organizations (ACOs). ACOs could take various forms, but they have generally been conceived of as groups of primary care physicians, special ists, and sometimes hospitals, joined together in either verti cally integrated systems or net works that are accountable for improving the quality and afford ability of care for a defined pa tient population and that are eli gible for financial bonuses if performance goals are met. The ACA takes a first step in this di rection by allowing Medicare to contract with ACOs; interest in this concept is also growing among commercial payers, Med icaid agencies, and several state legislatures (e.g., Colorado, Ver mont, and Washington).
Understandably, much of the debate about ACOs has focused on structuring provider networks, reimbursing providers, and de signing performancebased re wards and penalties for provid ers. Largely missing from these discussions is a role for patients. In many ACOlike models, includ ing Medicare's Physician Group Practice Demonstration project, patients who receive the majority of their care from participating providers have been assigned to an ACO through "invisible enroll ment," with no prospective noti fication and sometimes no aware ness by the patients that they're associated with an ACO. But a providerbased accountability model that is disconnected from the way patients seek care not only may fail to achieve its cost saving and quality goals, but may also give rise to a backlash among patients and providers. Except in cases of closed, integrated deliv ery systems (such as Kaiser Per manente or certain large provider organizations with capitated pay ments), in which consumers choose to use an ACO through their choice of insurance, most patients are not obligated to ob tain care only from a particular provider group.
Studies of the care patterns of Medicare beneficiaries, which helped to launch the ACO move ment, offer some evidence that patients tend to stick to a given provider group: 73% of benefi ciaries' visits for evaluation and management services (inpatient and outpatient) took place with in a primary hospital or involved its extended multispecialty med ical staff (an ACOlike grouping), and, on average, 64% of admis sions were to the primary hospi tal. 1 Yet one quarter of evalua tion and management visits and more than one third of hospital admissions involved outside pro viders. The fact that the ACO has imperfect control over an appre ciable amount of the care pro vided suggests that increasing pa tients' adherence to an ACO could improve efficiency and savings.
There has been little discus sion about binding patients to ACOs, however, largely because the freedom to choose one's pro viders is highly valued in U.S. health policy. The managed care backlash and the rise of pre ferred provider organizations in the late 1990s have been partial ly attributed to patients' unwill ingness to accept closed physi cian networks. Most Medicare beneficiaries have not enrolled in private plans that restrict pa tients' choice of physicians, even though these plans offer more generous benefits than does the feeforservice Medicare program. These consumer preferences sug gest that policymakers should focus on creating incentives to build patients' loyalty to an ACO (see table) .
One way to do so is to allow patients to share in their ACO's cost savings -for example, through a tiered provider net work, which allows patients to pay less at the point of care depending on their choice of pro vider. Under such an arrange ment, physicians would be sort ed into tiers according to their ACO affiliation, and patients would pay lower copayments for visits to physicians within their ACO. Not only might this ap proach bring more patient care under the influence of the ACO, it might also motivate providers to join an ACO. One barrier to its effectiveness might be inade quate consumer awareness and low use of the networks. 2 A second method for sharing savings with patients is to charge different premiums depending on whether patients choose to re ceive their care from an ACO and, if there's more than one ACO option, which one they select. Patients choosing an ACO that has lower costs than an alterna tive ACO (or than nonACO care) would pay lower monthly premi ums; in principle, tiered copay ments could be nested within such an arrangement. This strat egy takes advantage of the con siderable weight that consumers often place on their outofpock et premium (as compared with their total expected costs) when selecting a health plan. Experi ence shows that consumers do respond to premium differences in this type of arrangement. 3 However, such premium tiering presumes that once an ACO is selected, the patient is either limited to it for the year or faces higher cost sharing for going outside the ACO for care; this approach might thus be perceived as locking in patients to their ACO choice at the beginning of the year and might therefore be unpopular.
Another strategy draws from the lessons of behavioral econom ics and findings that consumers frequently accept default settings and fail to switch out of them because of procrastination or a belief that a default reflects an expert's recommendation. 4 Private health plans could assign patients to primary care physicians with in a lowcost, highquality ACO as the default, perhaps charging lower premiums or copayments for visits with these providers, but allow patients to opt out and seek care with other providers if they are willing to pay more out of pocket.
Initiatives that use shared sav ings or optout models are avail able to commercial plans in most markets. Without new legislation, however, Medicare probably can not offer such incentives; it will have to rely instead on other ways of encouraging patients to seek care within an ACO. One possibility is disseminating in formation to patients about the quality and costefficiency of the care they would get if they ad hered to a particular ACO. There is mixed evidence regarding the influence of quality reporting on patients' choices of providers or plans -suggesting that the way such information is presented will be important in determining the effectiveness of this approach. In a randomized experiment, Medi care beneficiaries who received personalized information about lowercost Part D plans were more likely to switch plans than were beneficiaries who were simply directed to a Web site where they could find such information on their own (28% vs. 17%). 5 Although minimizing "leak age" of the population for which an ACO is accountable may be important for coordinating and integrating care, there will always be some patients who would ob tain more effective care by turn ing to multiple ACOs. More than half of Medicare beneficiaries have five or more chronic condi tions that may be treated sepa rately or in combination. Al though some successful integrated systems provide efficient, high quality care for multiple condi tions, often the best cardiac care providers in a given market, for example, are not in the same sys tem as the best orthopedic care providers.
Aligning consumer incentives so that patients choose to seek care within a single ACO will have important implications for the ability of ACOs to reach their costsaving and quality goals. Policy alternatives such as deliv ering personalized information 
